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Abstract
Agents may contract some of their tasks to other agent even when they do not
share a common goal. An agent may try to contract some of the tasks that it cannot
perform by itself, or that may be performed more eciently by other agents. One self-
motivated agent may convince another self-motivated agent to help it with its task, by
promises of rewards, even if the agents are not assumed to be benevolent. We propose
techniques that provide ecient ways to reach contracting in varied situations: the
agents have full information about the environment and each other or subcontracting
when the agents do not know the exact state of the world. We consider situations of
repeated encounters, cases of asymmetric information, situations where the agents lack
information about each other, and cases where an agent subcontracts a task to a group
of agents. Situations where there is competition among possible contracted agents or
possible contracting agents are also considered. In all situations we would like the
contracted agent to carry out the task eciently without the need of close supervision
by the contracting agent.

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Agents acting in non-collaborative environments may benet from contracting some of their
tasks to other agents. In this paper we present techniques for ecient contracting that can be
used in dierent cases of multi-agent environments where the agents do not have a common
goal and there is no globally consistent knowledge.
We consider situations where a self-motivated agent that tries to carry out its own in-
dividual plan in order to fulll its own tasks may contract some of its tasks to another
self-motivated agent(s). An agent may benet from contracting some of its tasks that it can-
not perform by itself, or when the task may be performed more eciently by other agents.
The main question addressed in this paper is how one agent may convince another agent
to do something for it when the agents do not share a global task and the agents are not
assumed to be benevolent. Furthermore, we would like the contracted agent to carry out the
task eciently without the need of close supervision of the contracting agent, enabling the
contracting agent to carry out other tasks simultaneously.
There are two main ways to convince another self-motivated agent to perform a task that
is not among its tasks: by threatening to interfere with the agent carrying out its own tasks,
or by promising rewards
[
Kraus et al., 1993
]
. This paper concentrates on subcontracting by
rewards which may be in two forms. The rst approach is a bartering system, where one
agent may promise to help the other with its future tasks in return for current help. However,
as was long ago observed in economics, barter is not an ecient basis for cooperation. In
particular, in a multi-agent environment, an agent that wants to subcontract a task to
another agent may not have the ability to help it in the future, or one agent that can help in
fullling another agent's task may not need help in carrying out its own tasks. The second
approach is a monetary system which is developed for the provision of rewards, and which
can later utilized for other purposes.
In this paper we present an automated multiagent model where contracting is benecial.
We propose to use a monetary system in the multi-agent environment that allows for side
payments and rewards between the agents, and where prots may be given to the owners
of the automated multiagent. The agents will be built to maximize expected utilities that
increase with the monetary values, as will be explained below. Assuming that each agent has
its own personal goals, contracting would allow every agent to fulll its goals more eciently
as opposed to working on its own. One of the advantageous of contracting is that there
usually is no need for negotiation among the agents and therefore communication is limited.
The issue of contracting by rewards has been investigated in economics and game-
theory for the last two decades (e.g.,
[
Arrow, 1985; Ross, 1973; Raizsmusen, 1989;
2
Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992
]
). These works consider dierent
types of contracts for dierent applications. Examples of these are contracts between: a rm,
and an employer or employers (e.g.,
[
Nalebu and Stiglitz, 1983a; Baiman and Demski, 1980;
Banerjee and Beggs, 1989; Macho-stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1991
]
); a government and tax-
payers (e.g.,
[
Caillaud et al., 1988
]





ance company and a policy holder (e.g.,
[
Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983; Harris and Raviv, 1978;
Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971
]
); a buyer and a seller (e.g.,
[
Matthews, 1983; Myerson, 1983
]
);
a government and rms (e.g.,
[
McAfee and McMillan, 1986
]









, etc. In these situations two
parties are usually be found. The rst party (called \the agent" in the economics literature),
must choose an action from a number of possibilities, thereby aecting the outcome of both
parties. The second party (named \the principal"), has the additional function of prescribing
payo rules. Before the rst party (i.e., the agent) chooses the action, the principal deter-
mines a rule (i.e., a contract) that species the fee to be paid to the other party as a function
of the principal's observations. Despite the similarity of the above applications, they dier
in several aspects, such as, the amount of information that is available to the parties, the
observations that are made by the principal and the number of agents. Several concepts and
techniques are applied to the principal-agent paradigm in the relevant economics and game
theory literature.
We consider varied situations of automated multiagent environments; situations of cer-
tainty vs uncertainty, full information vs partial information, symmetric information vs
asymmetric information and bilateral situations vs situations where there are more than two
automated agents in the environment. For each of these situations we found appropriate eco-
nomics mechanism and techniques that can be used for contracting in the automated agents
environment. We adjust these results to the automated agents environment and present all
of them using uniform concepts that are appropriate to automated agents, i.e., translating
the dierent concepts used in the various economics and game theory papers into a uniform
framework. The contracting agent does not supervise the contracted agents' performance
and by using the appropriate techniques, the agent that designs the contract maximizes
its personal expected utilities, given the constraints of the other agent(s). Throughout the
paper, we use a robotics domain to demonstrate the contracting techniques introduced above.
2 Related work in DAI
Research in DAI is divided into two basic classes: Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) and
Multi-Agent Systems (MA)
[
Bond and Gasser, 1988; Gasser, 1991
]
. Research in DPS (e.g.,
3
[
Lesser and Erman, 1980; Lesser, 1991; Conry et al., 1990; Smith and Davis, 1983; Durfee,
1988
]
) considers how the work involved in solving a particular problem can be divided among
a number of modules or \nodes." The modules in a DPS system are centrally designed to
improve performance, stability, modularity, and/or reliability. They include the development
of cooperation mechanisms designed to nd a solution to a given problem.
Research in MA (e.g.,
[
Sycara, 1987; Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1991; Kraus and Lehmann,
1994; Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1991
]
) is concerned with coordinating intelligent behavior
among a collection of autonomous (possibly heterogeneous) intelligent (possibly pre-existing)
agents. In MA, there is no global control, no globally consistent knowledge, and no globally
shared goals or success criteria. There is, however, a possibility for real competition among
the agents.
In DPS, on the other hand, there are no implicit conicts among the agents, and it is
assumed that it is in the agents' interest to help one another. This help can be in the form of




. In task sharing, an agent which cannot
fulll a task on its own, will attempt to pass the task, in whole or in part, to other agents,
usually on a contractual basis
[
Smith and Davis, 1983
]
. This approach assumes that agents
not otherwise occupied will readily take on the task. Similarly, results and information are
shared among agents in such environments with no expectation of reciprocation
[
Lesser and
Erman, 1980; Lesser, 1991; Conry et al., 1990
]
. This benevolence is based on an assumption
common to many approaches to coordination: that the system's goal is to solve the problem
as best as it can, thereby giving the agents shared, often implicit, global goals that they are
all unselshly committed to achieving.
Contracting, in particular, was previously used in the Distributed Problem Solvers
framework for tasks allocation. In the Contract Net protocol
[
Smith and Davis, 1981;
Smith and Davis, 1983
]
, a contract is an explicit agreement between an agent that gen-
erates a task (the manager) and an agent that is willing to execute the task (the contractor).
The manager is responsible for monitoring the execution of a task and processing the results
of its execution, whereas the contractor is responsible for the actual execution of the task.
The manager of a task advertises the task's existence to other agents. Available agents (po-
tential contractors) then evaluate the task announcements made by several managers and
submit bids for which they are suited. Since all the agents have a common goal and are
designed to help one another, there is no need to motivate an agent to bid for tasks or to do
its best in executing it if its bid is chosen. In contrast, since agents are self motivated in our
work, a contract must specify the fee to be paid to the contracted agent as a function of the
contracting agent's observations.
The \benevolent" agents are also taken into account in Malone's renement of the
4
contract-net protocol. The rened protocol is based on a more sophisticated economic model
[
Malone et al., 1988
]
, proving optimal behavior under certain conditions. Similar to the orig-
inal Contract Net protocol, also in this model there is no need to motivate the agents to bid
or to make decisions in order to maximize the global expected utility of the system.
A modied version of the Contract Net protocol for competitive agents in the transporta-




. It provides a formalization of the bidding and
awarding decision process based on marginal cost calculating on local agent criteria. In
particular, an agent will send a bid for a delivery task only if the maximum price men-
tioned in the task announcement is greater than what the deliveries will cost that agent. A
simple motivation technique is presented to convince agents to make bids; the actual price
of a contract is half way between the price mentioned in the task announcement and the





centrally designed will carry out their contracted tasks eciently and without monitoring.




is forced to accept a




Pattison et al., 1987
]
a language for specication of complex relations among agents
in DPS is described. Using this language, a designer of a system can dene hierarchical
relationships among the agents and specify to one agent the other agents' authority on it.
The \authority" parameter indicates how much emphasis the agent should give to requests
that arrive from dierent agents. Since the agents are not self motivated, their willingness to
help another agent will depend upon the designer's instructions. Pattison et. al. suggested
an additional mechanism of contracting to the one presented in the Contract Net protocol
using focused addressing. This would mean, in addition to broadcasting requests for bids, an
agent in
[
Pattison et al., 1987
]
has the option of asking for help from another agent directly
if it knows that the other agent can help it in its task and knows the other agent's address.
In this paper, we also allow both of these addressing methods.
Subcontracting in Distributed Problem Solving also appears in the paradigm of planning
for multiple agents, where a single intelligent agent (usually called the master) constructs a
plan to be carried out by a group of agents (the slaves) and then hands out the pieces of
the plan to the relevant individuals
[






presents a formal logical model for a master-slave relationship by one-way
communication. The main problem for a master is not to convince other agents to carry
out the plan appropriately without its supervision, but rather nding the best plan and
synchronizing the agent's actions. The simple master/slaves model was extended by Ephrati
and Rosenschein
[
Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1993
]
to allow the \slaves" more freedom in
5






proposes the use of market price mechanisms for coordination
and task distribution in distributed planning systems. The agents are divided into consumers
and producers and use an iterative method to adjust prices and reach an equilibrium. This
method is applicable under the \perfect competition" assumption which is appropriate when
there are numerous agents, each small in respect to the entire economy. We consider con-
tracting when there are usually a small number of agents in the environment. We also deal
with situations where agents are uncertain about the world, and the contracted agents (the
producers in Wellman's terminology) may not carry out the tasks as promised.
Negotiation is the main paradigm that is used for coordination and task distribution
in multi-agent systems (MA) where agents are self motivated. While contracting is most
appropriate for a hierarchical relationship, negotiation is most appropriate when all agents
are on the same level. For example, Sycara
[
Sycara, 1990; Sycara, 1987
]
presents a model
of negotiation that combines case-based reasoning and optimization of the multi-attributed
utilities. This model is used in labor management negotiations where two agents need to
agree on an acceptable agreement. In
[
Kraus et al., 1994; Kraus and Wilkenfeld, 1993
]
a
set of self-motivated autonomous agents have a common goals that they want to satisfy as
soon as possible. Each agent, while wanting to minimize its costs, prefers to do as little as
possible and therefore tries to reach an agreement over the division of labor. Zlotkin and
Rosenschein
[
Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1993
]
present a general theoretical negotiation model
for rational agents who are in a similar status.
Negotiation is communication consuming, therefore, the above models are appropriate
when communication is not expensive. The contracting model that we present in this paper
usually requires only one round of exchanging messages, but requires intensive computa-
tion, and therefore, is more appropriate when communication is expensive and computation
resources are available.
Contracting in multi-agent systems was previously studied in
[
Grosz and Kraus, 1993
]
.
A formal denition of the mental state of an agent (or a group of agents) that would like to
contract out one of its tasks was presented. Contracting depends mainly on an agent believe
that by taking some action (and thus bringing about a certain state of aairs), it can get an-
other agent to perform an action. However, a detailed algorithm for nding the \motivating"
action and the appropriate contracted agent is not presented in
[
Grosz and Kraus, 1993
]
.
The main contribution of this paper is the presentation of techniques for identifying possible
contracted agents and to drafting benecial contracts (i.e., the \motivations" action).
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3 Multiagent Framework for Contracting
In the environments that we discuss, there are two types of agents. We will refer to the agent
(or agents) that subcontracts one of its tasks to another agent or agents as the contracting
agent(s), and to the agent(s) that may agree to carry out the task as the contracted agent(s).
In order to convince the contracted agent to do the task and motivate it to do well, the
contracting agent needs to provide the contracted agent with a benecial contract. The
contracted agent's success in carrying out the task depends on the time and work intensity
which the contracted agent puts into fullling the task, which is referred to as the eort
level. We propose constructing a monetary system in the multi-agent environment, which
will provide a way for allocating rewards and evaluating outcomes.
What are the conditions that a contracting multiagent (CMA) framework should satisfy
(for any specic distributed multi-agent domain), such that it should be accepted by all the
designers of agents (for that specic domain)?
Simplicity: That the contract be simple and that there be an algorithm to compute it.
Pareto-Optimality: That there be no other contracted arrangement that is preferred by
both sides over the one they have reached. Meaning that there be no other contract
where the utilities of both agents are greater than their utilities in the contract agreed
upon.
Stability: That the results be in equilibrium and that the contracts be reached and executed
without delay.
3.1 Agents' Utility Function
A designer of an automated agent in any environment needs to provide the agent with a
decision mechanism based on some given set of preferences. Numeric representations of these





. We therefore propose that each designer of autonomous agents will develop a
numerical utility function that it would like its agent to maximize.
This is especially important in situations where there is uncertainty in the situation
and the agents need to make decisions under risk considerations. There are three types of
behaviors toward risk. An agent is risk averse if it always prefers to receive an outcome
equal to the expected value of an uncertain situation over entering an uncertain situation.
An agent is risk prone if it always prefers to enter an uncertain situation over receiving an
7
outcome equal to its expected outcome for entering an uncertain situation. An agent is risk
neutral if it is indierent between the two options.
Decision theory oers a formalism for capturing risk attitudes. If an agent's utility
function is concave, it is risk averse. If the function is convex, it is risk prone, and a linear





We propose that a utility function of an automated agent in our contracting multiagent
(CMA) environment depends on the agent's monetary gain and eort. Our framework does
not restrict the designer of an agent to any specic utility function since we assume that the
personality of the designer (e.g., his/her attitude toward risk) will aect his/her choice of the
agent's utility function. However, we do provide the designer with ways to evaluate how the
choice of a utility function may aect the possible outcomes of his/her agent's interactions
with other agents, how the type of a utility function may aect the contract that will be
reached, and the complexity of nding a contract.
3.2 Equilibrium Concepts in Multi-agent Environments
The contracting agent's strategy in our CMA environment species which contract to oer
to the contracted agent. The contracted agent's strategy species how it should respond
to a given oer. Our desire is to obtain strategies which are in an equilibrium, since if the
agents use these strategies, the environment becomes more stable. Since we consider dierent
situations, we use dierent concepts of equilibria to gain stability.
In simple situations, with complete information, we use the Nash equilibrium concept.






) is inNash equilib-
rium if no agent can benet from deviating from its strategy (i.e., choose another strategy),




) are pair of strategies
for the contracting and contracted agents respectively that are in Nash equilibrium, then if
s
cing
species a contract that the contracting agent should oer the contracted agent, the
contracted agent does not have a better response but to act according to s
ced
. On the other
hand, given the possible responses of the contracted agent according to s
ced
, the contracting




When there is incomplete information, e.g., agents do not know their opponents' exact
types, the notion of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is useful. This equilibrium includes a set
of beliefs (one for each agent) and a set of strategies. A strategy combination and a set of
beliefs form a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if the strategies are in Nash equilibrium given the
1
As we see in Section 7.1 there are situations where there are more than one equilibrium. In specic
cases, an agent's strategy may belong to two equilibria. If it is the rst to take an action, it needs to take
into consideration the possible behavior of its opponent in all equilibria.
8






When there are several stages of the interaction among the agents, we use the concept
of perfect equilibrium. It can be said that a set of strategies is in perfect equilibrium





There are two approaches for nding equilibria in the type of situations we consider in
this paper. The rst is the straight game theory approach: a search for Nash strategies or
for perfect equilibrium strategies. The second is the economist's standard approach: set up a
maximization problem and solve, using calculus. The drawback of the game theory approach
is that it is not mechanical and it is dicult to develop a computer program that will nd
the Nash equilibrium strategies.
2
The maximization approach, on the other hand, is much
easier to implement. The problem with the maximization approach in our context is that
the players must solve their optimization problems together: the contracted agent's strategy
aects the contracting agent's maximization problem and vice versa. In this paper we will
use, whenever possible, the maximization approach, with some care. This means that the
maximization problem of the designer of the contract (usually the contracting agent) will
include, as a constraint, its opponent's (usually the contracted agent) maximization problem.
The maximization problem of the contract's designer agent can be solved automatically by
the agent. That is, the contracts that we provide maximize the expected utility of the
designer of the contract (i.e., the contracting agent). However, when designing the contract,
the agent must take into consideration the possible responses of its opponent, which is also
trying to maximize its own expected utility.
3.3 Notations
We use the following notations in the rest of the paper. A summary of this notation is given
in Figure 1.
Eort level: Given a task, there are several eort levels that the contracted agent may
take when trying to fulll the task. We denote the set of these eorts by Eort. We
use e; e
i
2 Eort to denote specic eort levels. In all cases, the contracted agent will
decide how much eort to expend, but its decision may be inuenced by the contract
oered by the contracting agent.
2
In our previous work on negotiation under time constraints, we have identied perfect-equilibrium strate-
gies and proposed to develop a library of meta strategies to be used when appropriate
[
Kraus and Wilkenfeld,














2 Outcome. q(e) 2 Outcome
of carrying out a task. when q is a function of e 2 Eort




2 Rewards r(q) when
the contracted agent r is a function of q 2 Outcome
U
ced
The contracted agent's utility function
U
cing
The contracting agent's utility function
û 2 IR Contracted agent's utility from outside options. (reservation price)
e

2 Eort Ecient eort level for the contracting agent Given contracted agent constraints
q

2 Outcome Ecient outcome for the contracting agent Given contracted agent constraints
Figure 1: Notations used in the paper
Outcome: While the contracted agent's expected utility depends on its eort level in per-
forming a task, the expected utility of the contracting agent depends heavily of the
outcome of performing a task. The set of possible outcomes is denoted by Outcome.
We assume that in the CMA environment, the outcome depends on the eort level
expended by the contracted agent and that it can be expressed using the monetary
system. We denote the monetary value of performing a task by q 2 Outcome. Given
an eort level e 2 Eort, q(e) denotes the monetary outcome of performing a task, as
a function of e. This function increases with the eort involved. That is, the more
time and eort put in by the contracted agent, the better the outcome.
Rewards: In order to convince the contracted agent to carry out a task, the contracting
agent oers to pay the contracted agent a reward using the CMA monetary system.
We denote the set of possible rewards by Rewards and its elements by r. The reward
r 2 Rewards may be a function of the outcome from carrying on the task (i.e., q 2
Outcome).
Utility functions: We denote the contracted agent's utility function by U
ced
: Eort 
Rewards! IR. We assume that in the CMA environment the contracted agent prefers
to do as little as possible and gain higher rewards, therefore U
ced
is a decreasing function
in eort and an increasing function in rewards.
We denote the contracting agent's utility function by U
cing
: OutcomeRewards! IR.
The contracting agent prefers to give lower rewards and obtain larger outcomes. Thus,
U
cing
is an increasing function with the outcome and decreasing function with the
reward being paid to the contracted agent.
10
Outside options: If the contracted agent does not accept the contract from the contracting
agent and does not carry out the task it can then either perform another task (its own
or others) or just be idle and not do anything. Its expected utility in such a situation
is its reservation price and we refer to it as û.
In our system we assume that the contracting agent rewards the contracted agent after
the task is carried out. In such situations there should be a technique for enforcing these
rewards. So that in the case of multiple encounters, reputational considerations may yield
appropriate behavior. Some external intervention may be required to enforce commitments
in a single encounter, e.g., the responsibility of the contracting agent's owner for its contracts
toward the contracted agent's owner.
Our last denitions are concerned with the value of the contracts to the contracting agent.
The rst-best contract will provide the contracting agent with a prot that is equal to a prot
it could get when there is complete information and the contracting agent can supervise and
observe the contracted agent(s)' actions. The second-best contract is Pareto-optimal given
information asymmetry and constraints on writing contracts, e.g., the contracting agent does
not observe the contracted agent(s)' actions.
4 Full Information
At rst we would assume that all the relevant information about the environment and the
situation is known to both agents. In the simplest case the contracting agent can observe
and supervise the contracted agent's eort and actions and force it to make the eort level
preferred by the contracting agent by paying only when the required eort is made. The
amount of eort required from the contracted agent will be the one that maximizes the
contracting agent's outcome, taking into account the task fulllment and the rewards that
need to be made to the contracted agent.
However, in most situations it is either not possible or too costly for the contracting agent
to supervise the contracted agent's actions and observe its level of eort. In some cases, the
contracting agent may be trying to carry out another task at the same time, or it cannot
reach the site of the action (and that is indeed the reason for subcontracting).
We consider two cases in such situations:
 In Section 4.1 we consider the case where there is no uncertainty with respect to the
result of the contracted agent's actions.
 In Section 4.2 there is uncertainty concerning the outcome of an action taken by the
contracted agent.
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4.1 Contracts under Certainty
Suppose both agents have full information about the world and about each other, but the
contracting agent does not supervise the contracted agent's actions. There is no uncertainty
however, concerning the results of the contracted agent's actions, i.e., the outcome is a
function of the contracted agent's eort. If this function is known to both agents, the
contracting agent can oer the contracted agent a forcing contract
[
Harris and Raviv, 1978;
Raizsmusen, 1989; Douglas, 1989
]
. This contract means that the contracting agent will pay
the contracted agent only if it provides the outcome required by the contracting agent. If the
contracted agent accepts the contract, it has to perform the task with the eort level that
the contracting agent nds to be most protable to itself, even without supervision. Note,
the outcome won't necessarily be a result of the highest eort on the part of the contracted
agent, but rather a result of the eort which provides the contracting agent with the desired
outcome.
The contracting agent should pick an eort level e

2 Eort that will generate the
ecient output level q

2 Outcome. Since we assume that there are several possible agents
available for contracting in equilibrium, the contract must provide the contracted agent at
least with the utility û.
3







)) = û and U
ced
(e; r(q)) < û for e 6= e

. û is the minimal reward that will
make the contracted agent accept the contract. Since the contracting agent would like to
pay the contracted agent as little as possible, but wants the contracted agent to accept the
oer, then if the outcome reveals that the contracted agent provided the required eort level,
the contracting agent will pay the contracted agent û. If the contracted agent accepts the
contract but doesn't choose the appropriate eort level, its reward will be even less than û.
We demonstrate this case in the following example.
Example 4.1 Contracting Under Certainty
The US and Germany have sent several mobile robots independently to Mars to collect
minerals and ground samples and to conduct experiments. One of the US robots has to dig
some minerals on Mars far from the other US robots. There are several German robots in that
area and the US robot would like to subcontract some of its digging. The US robot approaches
one of the German robots that can dig in three levels of eort (e): Low, Medium and High
respectively denoted by 1,2 and 3. The US agent cannot supervise the German robot's eort
since it wants to carry out another task simultaneously. The value of digging is q(e) =
p
100e.
The US robot's utility function, if a contract is reached, is U
cing
(q; r) = q r and the German
3
We assume that if the contracted agent is indierent between two actions, it will choose the one preferred
by the contracting agent.
12
robot's utility function in the case that it accepts the contract is U
ced




where r is the reward to the German robot. If the German robot rejects the contract, it will
busy itself with maintenance tasks and its utility will be 10. It is easy to calculate that the
best eort level from the US robot's point of view is 2, in which there will be an outcome
of
p






200 and 0 otherwise. This contract will be accepted by the German robot and its eort
level will be Medium.
There are two additional issues of concern, the rst being how the contracting agent will
choose which agent to approach. In a situation of complete information (we consider the
incomplete information case in Section 5) it should compute the expected utility for itself
from each contract with each agent and choose the one with the maximal expected utility.
Our model is also appropriate in the case where there are several contracting agents,
but only one possible contracted agent. In such cases, there should be information about
the utilities of the contracting agents in the event that they do not sign a contract, i.e.,
the contracting agents' reservation price. The outcome to the contracting agent in this case
should be equal to its reservation price. Each contracting agent should oer a contract that
maximizes the utility of the contracted agent, rather than its own, as when there are several
contracted agents and one contracting. This maximization process should be done under the
constraint that the contracting agent will gain its reservation price.
4.2 Contracts Under Uncertainty
We continue to assume in this case that the agents have full information about each other,
and that the contracting agent does not observe the contracted agent's behavior. However, in
most subcontracting situations, there is uncertainty concerning the outcome of an action. If
the contracted agent chooses some eort level, there are several possibilities for an outcome.
For example, suppose an agent on Mars subcontracts digging for samples of a given mineral
and suppose that there is uncertainty about the depth of the given mineral at the site. If
the contracted agent chooses a high eort level and the mineral level is deep underground
the outcome may be similar to the case where the contracted agent chooses a low level of
eort and the mineral is located near the surface. However, if the contracted agent chooses
a high eort level when the mineral is located near the surface, the outcome may be higher
and thus, better to the contracting agent. In such situations the outcome of performing a
task does not reveal the exact eort level of the contracted agent and choosing a stable and
maximal contract is much more dicult.
Assuming that the world may be in one of several states, neither the contracting agent
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nor the contracted agent knows the exact state of the world when agreeing on the contract.
There is the possibility that the contracted agent may gain more information about the
world during or after completing the task, but only after signing the contract and choosing
the eort level. The contracting agent can not gain more information about the world.
Following
[
Harris and Raviv, 1978
]
, we also assume that there is a set of possible out-









< ::: < q
n
depends upon the state of the world and upon the eort level of the
contracted agent. Furthermore, we assume that, given a level of eort, there is a probability
distribution attached to the outcomes that is known to both agents.
4
Formally, we assume






) = 1 and for all q
i




This characterizes the situations
where the contracting agent is not able to use the outcome to determine the contracted
agent's eort level unambiguously.
The contracting agent's problem is to nd a contract that will maximize the contracting
agent's expected utility, knowing that the contracted agent may reject the contract or, even if





ing agent's reward to the contracted agent can be based only on the outcome. Let us assume
that in the contract that will be oered by the contracting agent, for any q
i
i = 1; :::; n; the
contracting agent will pay the contracted agent the reward r
i
. The maximization problem
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A practical question is how the agents nd the probability distribution. It may be that they have
preliminary information about the world, e.g., what the possibility is that a given mineral will be in that
area of Mars. In the worst case, they may assume an equal distribution. The model can be easily extended
to the case that each agent has dierent beliefs about the state of the world, i.e., has its own probability






The formal model in which the outcome is a function of the state of the world and the contracted agent's
eort level, and in which the probabilistic function gives the probability of the state of the world which is
independent of the contracted agent's eort level is a special case of the model described here.
[
Page, 1987;




Equation (1) states that the contracting agent tries to choose the reward to the contracted
agent so as to maximize its expected utility subject to two constraints. First, the rewards
to the contracted agent must be large enough to motivate the contracted agent to prefer
the contract rather than to reject it. Constraint (2) is called the individual-rationality (IR)
constraint. This constraint requires that the expected utility of the contracted agent will
be at least as much as its reservation price (û). The second constraint (3), which is called
participation constraint (IC), provides the contracted agent with a motivation to choose the
eort level that the contracting agent prefers, given the contract it is oered. This means,
given the agreed rewards, ê will provide the contracted agent with the highest outcome.
In order to be able to use the above framework in the CMA environment, the agents
should be able to solve the above maximization problem. The algorithms to be used depend
primarily on the utility functions of the agents, as we will describe in the next two sections.
4.2.1 Risk Neutral Agents
If the contracting agent and the contracted agent are risk neutral, then solving the maxi-
mization problem can be done using any linear programming technique (e.g, simplex, see for
example
[
Pfaenberger and Walker, 1976; Spivey and Thrall, 1970
]
.) Furthermore, in most
situations, the solution will be very simple: the contracting agent will receive a xed amount










Example 4.2 Risk Neutral Agents Under Uncertainty
Suppose the utility function of the German robot from Example 4.1 is U
ced
(r; e) = r   e
and that it can choose between two eort levels, Low (e=1) and High (e=2), and that its





= 10, the US robot's utility function remains as it was in the previous example, i.e.,
U
cing
(q; r) = q   r.



































. The German robot will choose the High level eort.
4.2.2 The Contracted Agent is Risk Averse
When the agents are not neutral toward risk, the problem of solving the contracting agent's
maximization problem is much more dicult. However, if the utility functions for the agents
are carefully chosen, an algorithm does exist.
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Suppose the contracted agent is risk averse and the contracting agent is risk neutral (the





presented a three-steps procedure to nd appropriate contracts in such
situations. The rst step of the procedure is to nd for each possible eort level, the set of
reward contracts that will induce the contracted agent to choose that particular eort level.
The second step of the procedure is then to nd the contract which supports that eort level
at the lowest cost to the contracting agent. The third step of the procedure is to choose the
eort level that maximizes prots, given the necessity to support that eort with a costly
reward contract. Formally, step one and two are as follows: Suppose the contracting agent
wants the contracted agent to choose the eort level e
0



























































)for all e 2 Eort (6)
The rst constraint (5) requires that the expected utility for the contracted agent will
be at least as good as its outside options (its reservation price). The second constraint (6)
requires that given the contract, the contracted agent will prefer to take the eort level e
0
.
The minimization problem states that the contracting agent is looking for a contract where
it can pay as little as possible to induce the contracted agent to choose e
0
. For this mini-
mization problem there is an algorithm given that U
ced
satises several properties, including
the property that the preference of the contracted agent over entering uncertain situations
are independent of its actions
[









for every e 2 Eort (where the set may
be empty since there could be eort levels which the contracting agent cannot make the
contracted agent choose), and the minimum expected reward C(e) for any eort level, the






the problem of nding a contract when the contracting agent can choose an eort
level from a real interval is considered. Rogerson identies the sucient condition in which the constraints
(IC) can be replaced with the requirement that the eort level be a stationary point for the contracted
agent. In such situations a solution can be calculated using the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem.
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The contracted agents computational task is easier. After being oered a contract, the
contracted agent needs only to check the validity of the inequalities that appear as constraints
in the contracting agent's maximization problem. In particular, the contracted agent needs
to check the validity of the individual-rationality constraint (IR) to decide whether to accept
the contract. When the contracted agent needs to decide which eort level to provide, it
should consider its expected utility from its eort level, similar to maximization problem
described in the participation constraints (IC). In both cases, since all variables are known,
based on the suggested contract, these checks are very easy.
Example 4.3 Risk Averse Contracted Agent Under Uncertainty. Suppose the situ-
ation is exactly as in Example 4.2 but the designer of the robot determines that the contracted
agent will be risk averse and its utility function is as in Example 4.1: U
ced




and û = 1.



























  2e)  1 (9)












Using Grossman and Hart's three-steps procedure
[
Grossman and Hart, 1983
]
requires
that the contracting agent rst determine the minimal reward needed to make the contracted
agent choose e
1


































































The results of solving this minimization problem using Lagrangian multipliers is that the
minimal reward to make the contracted agent choose e
1








A similar minimization problem can be stated and solved for e
2
= 2. In this case the
minimal reward to make the contracted agent choose eort level e
2











Finally, the contracting agent should check which eort level it prefers, given the above



































). The conclusion is that the contracting agent can obtain the largest
expected utilities by oering r
0
1












































  4)), and will realize that its expected utility from both is the same. It
















  4)  1 ), will accept the contract and choose eort level e
2
since
its expected utility from both eort levels are the same and e
2
is preferred by the contracting
agent.
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4.2.3 Obtaining Imperfect Information about the Contracted Agent Behavior
Even in situations where the contracting agent cannot observe the actions of the contracted
agent, it may be able to gain some information about its behavior. For example, it can gain
information by setting up a camera in the digging site. This information may be imperfect,
and the process of getting this information is called an imperfect (noisy) monitoring process.
In particular, if the contracted agent takes eort level e, then the result of such a monitoring









. These results will enable the contracting agent to obtain some estimation of the
contracted agent's eort level. The main question is however, whether using such monitoring
is benecial.
It has been shown that if the contracted agent is risk neutral, there are no gains (to
either agent) from the use of any monitoring mechanism
[




In the rest of the paper we won't specify the contracted agent's computation procedures, since in most
of the situations, given a contract, the contracted agent needs only to check the validity of the inequalities
that appear as constraints in the contracting agent's maximization problem, similar to the check done in
this example. Since all variables are known, based on the suggested contract, this check is straight forward.
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if the contracted agent is risk averse, there are potential gains to monitoring. In particular,
this is the case if a contract of the following form is an optimal monitoring contract: If the
contracted agent's action is judged acceptable on the basis of the monitored outcome, the
contracted agent will then be paid according to a prespecied schedule. Otherwise, it will
receive less preferred, xed rewards
[
Harris and Raviv, 1979
]
.






Example 4.4 Suppose the utility function of the German robots from the previous examples
is U
ced






, its reservation price û = 0 and the utility function of the US robot
is, as in previous examples U
cing
(q; r) = q   r. Suppose the world is in situation  which is
uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and the outcome function is q(e; ) = e+ . The monitoring
technology then includes only monitors, which are uniformly distributed on [e  ; e+ ] for
some  > 0. Meaning that if the contracted agent chooses eort level e, the monitor will
provide an equal probability number , between e   and e+ .












The eort level chosen by the German robot depends on . If  < 2
 1:25
then it will



















If   2
 1:25
then the German robot will not choose the required level of eort, but rather









   and the German robot won't get any reward.




, and the German robot's expected utility
is still 0, while the expected utility of the US robot in this case is
1
2





In both cases, the US' expected utility is more than
1
2
, which is what it can expect if it
does not use monitoring mechanism.
From the above results, it follows that when  > 2
 1:25
, the rewards to the German robot
increases with , its eort level decreases with , and the US robot's expected utility decreases
with . These results t the belief that as monitoring becomes less precise (i.e.,  increases),
the contracting agent's expected utility decreases.
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5 Asymmetric and Incomplete Information
There are some situations where the contracted agent may have more information than the
contracting agent. The contracted agent may have obtained more information concerning
the environment, e.g., the German robot may know the mineral level since it is at the digging
site, while the US robot may have only some probabilistic beliefs on the level of the minerals.
In other situations the contracting agent may not know the utility function of the contracted
agent. The contracted agent may be one of several types that reect the contracted agent's
ability to carry out the task, its eciency or the cost of its eort. However, we assume
that given the contracted agent's type, its utility function would be known to its party. For
example, suppose Germany builds robots of two types. The specications of the robots are
known to the German robots and to the US robots; however, the US robots do not know the
specic type of the German robots they will encounter.
The contracting agent could simply ask the contracted agent for the additional informa-
tion, i.e., its type or the state of the world, although the contracted agent will not tell the
truth unless the contracting agent provides it with a monetary incentive to do so. This will
often cause ineciency from the contracting agent's point of view.





as follows: the contracting agent oers the contracted agent a
menu of contracts that are functions of its type (or the state of the world) and the outcome.
If the contracted agent accepts the oer, it chooses a contract and announces it to the
contracting agent. Given this contract, the contracted agent chooses an eort level which
maximizes its own expected utility. In each of the menu's contracts, the contracted agent's
expected utility should be at least as high as its expected utility if it does not sign the
contract.
One of the useful results in this area is that without loss of generality it is enough to






We will consider several situations of asymmetric information.
 In Section 5.1 we consider the case where the state of the world is known to the
contracted agent, but not to the contracting agent.
 In Section 5.2 neither agent knows the state of the world before signing the contract,
but the contracted agent nds out that information after signing the contract, but
before choosing its eort level.
 In Section 5.3 the contracted agent's information is initially better than that of the
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contracting agent, but it knows the exact state of the world only after a contract is
signed (but before choosing the eort level).
 In Section 5.4 the contracted agent cannot predict the outcome based on its private
information both before and after signing the contract.
 In Section 5.5 both agents have some private information, e.g., they have some private
information on their types.
5.1 Asymmetric Information about the State of the World




. If the contracted agent chooses





. As in previous cases the contracted agent's utility function (U
ced
(e; r))
increases with the reward it gets from the contracting agent (r) and decreasing with its
eort (e). The contracting agent's utility function (U
cing
(q; r)) increases with the outcome
and decreases with its reward to the contracted agent.
We assume that the contracted agent knows the state of the world  but the contracting
agent has no denite knowledge about the state of the world, having only a probabilistic
belief. We denote its belief that the world is in state 
i









As we described above, in the rst step of the agents' interaction the contracting agent





). The contracted agent then will report its private information, i.e., the state of the
world, to the contracting agent. According to this message, the corresponding contract is
implemented. In the third step the contracted agent chooses its eort level, and is paid
according to the chosen contract and the outcome.
As was mentioned above, we will restrict our attention to direct mechanisms under which
the contracting agent reports the situation of the world honestly, motivated by the contract.






) is the best contract among the ones oered by
the contracting agent. This constraint is called \self-selection".
Formally,

























In addition, in each of the n contracts oered by the contracting agent to contracted
agent's utility should be higher than its reservation price. The contracting agent should nd
21






































We demonstrate this maximization problem in the next example.
Example 5.1 Contracting Under Asymmetric Information Suppose the digging site
of the German/US example may be in two states 
1
= 1 and 
2
= 2. The outcome function
is f(e; ) = e, the US robot's utility function is U
cing
(q; r) = q   r and the German robot's
utility function is U
ced
(e; r) = r  e
2
. Hence, with f(e; ) = e, the German's utility function
as a function of the output, reward and the state of the world is U
ced
(q; r; ) = r   (q=)
2
.
We also assume that the contracted agent's reservation price is û = 1 and the contracting




= 0:25) and with probability
0:75 that the situation is 
2
.
























































; i = 1; 2
If the output function f is twice dierentiable in e, with f
e





, then there is an interesting result concerning the contracting agent's preference over the
information available to the contracted agent. If the contracted agent has full information
about the state of the world before signing the contract, then the contracting agent's expected
utility is lower than in the case where it and the contracted agent have symmetric beliefs
(either perfect or imperfect) about the state of the world before signing the contract
[
Baiman
and Demski, 1980; Demski and Sappington, 1984
]
. This nding is a result of the fact that
when they share the same (perfect or imperfect) state of information the contracted agent




denotes the rst derivative of f by e and f
ee
is the second derivative.
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5.2 Asymmetric Information After Reaching an Agreement
In some situations, the contracted agent is able to collect more information before it performs
the agreed upon task but only after signing the contract. For example, when the German
robot reaches the digging site, it may nd out what the exact state of the world is and know
for sure what will be the outcome if it takes a specic level of eort.
If agreements are enforced, i.e., if the contracted agent cannot opt out of the agreement
after it is signed, then the only dierence between the previous case and the current one is,
that constraints (IR:16) should be about the expected utility of the contracted agent, rather
than its eventual utilities, since at the time of the contract, the exact utility is not known to
the contracted agent. If the agents have similar probabilistic beliefs about the state of the
world when signing the contract (i.e., 
i




















We demonstrate this in the following example.
Example 5.2 Risk Neutral Agents Under Asymmetric Information Suppose the sit-
uation is exactly as in Example 4.2, but the German robot can nd out more information
after the agents have reached a contract, but before choosing its level of eort. As in Ex-
ample 4.2 the contracted agent can choose between two eort levels Low (e=1) and High
(e=2) and its reservation price is û = 1, and there are two possible monetary outcomes to
the digging: q
1
= 8 and q
2
= 10. The agents' utility functions are as in Example 4.2.






















. Note that this yields the same
probabilistic outcome as in Example 4.2.
There are two possibilities for constructing the contracts, depending on which eort level




. It is clear that if






the contracted agent will choose the Low eort level.
If the contracting agent would like the contracted agent to choose eort level High in
these states, then the contracting agent should solve the following minimization problem (we






















































Similarly, we can formalize the problem where the contracted agent chooses eort level










= 2 and the expected utility for the




In order for the contracting agent to maximize its expected utility, the rst option is
better since it yields the contracting agent an expected outcome of 7
1
8
. This is higher than in




We would like to consider the option of monitoring in such situations. It was proved in
[
Harris and Raviv, 1979
]
that if the contracted agent is risk neutral, and if it is able to get
information about the exact state of the world after signing the agreement, then monitoring
is not valuable. If the contracted agent is risk averse, monitoring may be benecial as we
will explain in Section 5.6.
The contracting agent can design a contract that will make the contracted agent choose
the Pareto ecient eort level for the real state of the world.
If it is possible for the contracted agent to cancel the contract after obtaining the infor-
mation about the state of the world, then this possibility should be taken into consideration





When the contracted agent can opt out of an agreement, the question is what are its
alternatives at that point. It may be that it can still gets its original outside options, i.e.,
its reservation price û. In other situations, however, it may have already lost the original
outside option, and can gain less from a new option. Let us denote the contracted agent's
new reservation price by û
new
.
In such situations, the contracting agent needs to add an additional constraint to its

















This constraint veries that even when the contracted agent nd out more information about
the environment before it chooses its level of eort, it will benet from choosing the level e
i
and will keep the agreement.
Of course, these constraints reduce the contracting agent's expected utility, and it will
need to suggest to the contracted agent higher payments to make sure it won't opt out. We
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will demonstrate this in the case that the contracted agent is risk neutral as in Example 4.2.
Example 5.3 Risk Neutral Agents Under Asymmetric Information with Opting
Out
Suppose the situation is exactly as in Example 5.2, but before choosing its level of eort,
the German robot can opt out of the agreement and get its original reservation price (i.e.,
û
new
= û = 1). Therefore, instead of constraint 20, the following should be stated:
r
1
  1  1 r
2
  2  1 (23)
The contracting agent should then oer r
1
= 2 and r
2
= 3. The expected outcome for the
contracting agent will be 6.875 which is lower than in the case where the contracted agent
cannot opt out.
5.3 Asymmetric and Imperfect Information Before Contracting
We would like to consider the situation where the contracted agent's information is initially
better than that of the contracting agent, but it knows the exact state of the world only after
a contract is signed. For example, the German robot may initially have better information
about the level of the minerals than the US robot. However, it does not have full information
about the state of the world. Only after reaching the digging site (after signing an agree-
ment), does it nd the real level of the minerals. Note that in the previous section, both
agents have the same preliminary beliefs about the state of the world, and the asymmetry
in information arises only after reaching an agreement. On the other hand, in Section 5.1,
the contracted agent already knows the state of the world before signing the contract. That
is, the situation of this section is between that of Section 5.1 and the previous Section 5.2.
As in previous situations, we assume that the outcome is a function of the contracted
agent's eort level and the state of the world, i.e., q = f(e; ). At no time can the contracting
agent observe either e or .











1  i  n. Furthermore, the contracting agent does not know the exact probabilistic
distribution of , but rather knows that there are D possible probabilistic distributions }
d
,
and it believes with probability 
d
that the real distribution is }
d
.
Before signing the contract, the contracted agent does not know the actual state of the
world either, but it knows which probabilistic distribution function is the correct one.
We assume that the utility function of the contracted agent can be written as a function
of q and r as follows: U
ced
(q; r) = r   e(q; ) where f(e(q; ); ) = q. In such situations the
optimal strategy for the contracting agent
[
Harris and Townsend, 1981
]
is to design at most
25
D distinct contracts from which the contracted agent can make a binding choice by sending
a message to the contracting agent.
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is the reward to the contracted agent under that contract.
The rst set of constraints (IR:25) guarantees that any contract selected by the agent
provides him with a level of expected utility that is at least as good as its reservation price.
The second set of constraints (SS:26) ensures that the contracted agent will report honestly




















)g. Note, that if D = 1 the maximization problem is
as in Section 5.2.
5.4 Asymmetric Information and Uncertainty
There are some situations that are characterized by both private information and uncertainty.
This means that the contracted agent cannot predict the outcome based on its private
information, since the private information only provides a better estimation of what the
outcome may be.




. In the rst stage of the
interaction, the contracting agent oers the contracted agent a menu of contracts based on
a message it will send and the observed outcome. The contracted agent may reject the oer
or agree to it and sign a contract. In the second stage, the contracted agent may gain some
private information  about the world, after signing a contract, but before sending a message
or choosing an eort level, This information will help it to better predict what the outcome
will be given its level of eort. For example, when the German robot reaches the area where
26
it needs to dig, it determines the structure of this area (i.e., it collects information about the
world state). This information may not be complete, but it is not known to the US robot at
all. In the third stage, the contracted agent sends a message to the contracting agent and
chooses a level of eort. In the fourth stage the outcome is observed by both agents and the
contracted agent is paid according to the outcome and its earlier message.
Note that in such situations, the contracted agent has committed itself not to leave
the agreement once it has observed .
9





can concentrate on the class of contracts that induce the contracted agent to send a truthful





for any untruthful contracts, a truthful one can be found in which the expected utility
of the agents is the same.
The maximization problem of the contracting agent is similar to the one in Sections 5.2,
where, under the constraints, the contracted agent's utility is replaced by its expected utility
given .
5.5 Both Parties Have Private Information
There are some situations where both the contracting agent and the contracted agent have
private information, for example, the contracting agent has private information about its
type, and the contracted agent has private information about the world. To put it simply,
we assume that the actions taken by the contracted agent are observable by the contracting
agent, but there is uncertainty about the outcome. That is, we assume that, given a level of
eort, there is a probability distribution } which is attached to the possible outcomes that
is known to both agents (as in Section 4.2). Furthermore, we assume that the agents can
agree on probabilistic actions, i.e., they will agree that the contracted agent will choose its
level of eort using an agreed-upon probability distribution.
Suppose that each of the agents has some probabilistic beliefs about its opponent's private
information, then in order for an informed contracting agent to do better than an uninformed
one, it must actively participate in the contract selection and not only in the mechanism
design. One possibility is as follows
[
Maskin and Tirole, 1990
]
: there are up to four possible
stages in an interaction.
1. In the rst stage of the interactions, the contracting agent oers a mechanism to the
contracted agent which species:
9
In most of the situations the contracting agent is better o making such a commitment. But in some
situations, both agents can be made better o through reconstructing
[
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990; Laont




(a) a set of possible messages that each party can choose




can be chosen simultaneously by the con-
tracting and contracted agents respectively, a corresponding probabilistic function
of the eort level that will be chosen by the contracted agent (note that the prob-
abilistic choice mechanism and the eort level are observable by the contracting
agent).
(c) pairs of outcomes and rewards.
2. In the next stage the contracted agent accepts or refuses the mechanism. If it refuses
it gets some of the reservation price û, and the interaction ends.
3. The agents send each other the messages simultaneously.
4. The contracted agent performs the task at the appropriate eort level and is paid
according to the outcome.
As in previous cases, the agents can limit themselves to honest reports.
In situations where the exact type of the contracting agent does not directly inuence
the contracted agent's utilities, it was shown
[
Maskin and Tirole, 1990; Myerson, 1983
]
that the contracting agent can prot from the contracted agent's incomplete information.
The intuition behind these results is as follows; When the contracting agent proposes a
contract, it does it subject to two types of constraints. The (IR) constraints requires that
the expected utility of the contracted agent when accepting the contract will be higher than
the contracted agent's reservation price. There are also constraints to ensure that when
the contract is carried out, the contracted agent behaves in the appropriate way, given its
private information (IC). When the contracting agent does not have private information,
the constraints must hold individually for each type of contracting agent. If the contracted
agent has incomplete information about the contracting agent, the constraints need to hold
only in \expectation" over the suggested contracts which are functions of the contracting
agent's type. For this reason, a given type of contracting agent can raise its utility above the
case where the contracted agent is fully informed, by violating some constraints, as long as
they are oset by other types. Actually, in most of the situations, there exists a mechanism
in which all types of contracting agents do strictly better than the fully informed contracted
agent.
However, in order to take advantage of the contracted agent's incomplete information,
the contracting agent must refrain from revealing its type at the mechanism proposal stage
(i.e., stage 1 above). Otherwise, the constraints must hold for the revealed type, rather than
just for the expected types.
28
This means that if the selection of the mechanism by the contracting agent depends in any
way upon the contracting agent's individual type, then the selection of the mechanism itself
will convey information about its type to the contracted agent. Therefore, any contracting
agent, regardless of its type, should oer the same mechanism.
10
Cases in which the contracting agent's private information inuences the contracted
agent's utilities are more complex
[
Maskin and Tirole, 1992
]
. In such situations it is no
longer true that, without loss of generality, the contracting agent can postpone revealing its
type until the third stage of the interaction. The contracting agent may wish to disclose
information about itself in order to inuence the contracted agent's action, if so then the
contracting agent's proposal should balance between total disclosure and complete conceal-
ment. Furthermore, the contracting agent's expected utility when it has private information
which inuences the contracted agent's utility may be even lower than in the case the con-
tracting agent doesn't have any private information at all. This is because the contracted
agent's expected utility may be low, given some of the contracting agent's types denoted
by \bad" types. Therefore, when the contracted agent's probabilistic belief is that its op-
ponent's \bad" type is high (even if the actual type is not \bad"), the contracted agent
must be paid correspondingly high rewards to encourage it to accept the contract. Note
that in the rst case we considered, where the contracted agent is not directly inuenced
by the contracting agent's type, its original beliefs do not play an important role, since the
contracted agent cares only about how the contracting agent's type will aect its behavior
in the implementation of the mechanism, but no more than that.
5.6 Value of Information and Communication
There are two important questions related to situations of Asymmetric information
[
Melumad
and Reichelstein, 1989; Christensen, 1981
]
:
1. Will the contracting agent always be better o, the more the contracted agent knows
about the world?
2. Is communication benecial to the contracting agent. Meaning, is it better to the
contracting agent to suggest a menu of contracts to the contracted agent and ask it to
send a message informing it of the current state of the world, or will it be better o




Maskin and Tirole, 1990
]
show that any equilibrium of the mechanism design pre-
sented here can be computed as a Walrasian equilibrium of ctitious economy. In this economy, the traders







The second question is essential when communication is costly to the contracting agent.
Intuitively, it seems that both communications and a knowledgeable contracted agent will
allow for more ecient contracting. The contracted agent may use its knowledge to choose
the correct actions, and with a menu of contracts the contracted agent may select the rewards
tailored to the actual situation.
Surprisingly, the answer to both questions is that it is not always the case that commu-
nications and knowledgeable contracted agents will improve the contracting agents benets,
but rather their eect depends on the exact details of the situation. There are even situations





As we explained in Section 5.1, when the contracted agent has full private information
before signing the contract, the contracting agent's expected utility is lower than if they have
symmetric beliefs.
If the contracted agent acquires its information after signing the agreement, then its eect
on the contracting agent varies. The contracted agent may use its additional information in
two ways: it may use its information to shirk, thereby reducing the benets for the contract-





). Any additional information gained by the contracting






The disadvantage of communications is that the \self-selection" constraint can sometimes
be very restrictive, so that the information received by the contracting agent is not benecial.
This occurs particularly, if the contracted agent has perfect private information about the
world, i.e., given an action, it can anticipate the exact outcome, for any \appropriate" menu
of contracts. The contracting agent can then replicate its benets, using a single contract.
Furthermore, even if the contracted agent does not have perfect information, there are many
situations in which there is no value for communication
[
Melumad and Reichelstein, 1989;
Demougin, 1989
]
. These situations are such that the stochastic outcome is informative.
If the outcome is not informative, however
11
, then communication is valuable. It is
valuable for two reasons; because it allows the contracting agent to implement a more ecient
level of eort choices without having to pay the contracted agent for making it choose
correctly. Alternatively, menu contracts can be valuable even though the contracted agent's
action choices are unchanged. In such situations, the value of communication results from
rewards to the contracted agent.
There are, of course, situations where the contracting agent can use the information








In such a case, it may prefer the menu of contracts, even if it cannot benet in the current
interaction.
5.7 Several Contracted Agents Compete for the Job
There may be a situation where there are several agents in the environment, and the con-
tracting agent can choose one of them to do the job. The agents may each be of a dierent
type (measuring, for example, eciency and ability), or independently drawn from a set of
possible types.
If the contracting agent does not know the types of the other agents, the following
mechanism is appropriate: The contracting agent announces a set of contracts based on the
agent's type and asks the potential contracted agents to report their types. On the basis of
these reports the contracting agent chooses one agent
[





agent that is chosen, chooses a level of eort that is not observable by the contracting agent.
The rewards to the chosen contracted agent depend upon the contracted agent's reported
type and the observed outcome. As in previous cases, the contracting agent can use, with






An important aspect in the design of the contracts is the marginal return to the contract-
ing agent by increasing the probability that a specic type (e.g., z
i
) will be chosen. This
marginal return consists of the outcome minus the contracted agent's costs to produced the
required eort level, minus the rewards the contracted agent receives, and minus the increase
in the expected rewards to the other types of agents. The latter eect arises because, by
increasing the probability that a report of z
i
will be chosen, the contracting agent makes it
more attractive for higher types to pretend to be z
i
. To prevent this the contracting agent
must improve the rewards for all the types that are higher than z
i
.





) related to the above described aspect, and if the highest reported type is chosen,
then the contract may be optimal for the contracting agent. However, the contracting agent's
benets will be lower than in the case where it can observe the contracted agent's eort level
(i.e., it gets only the \second best" benets).
12
There are situations where the agents' types are multidimensional. That is, the contracting agent is
uncertain about dierent aspects of the contracted agent that are independent. For example, its digging
capabilities and its disk space. Techniques to formalized the maximization problem in such situations, and
methods to solve it can be found in
[





Suppose the contracting agent wants to subcontract its tasks several (nite) times. Two
types of contracts are possible in such situations: long term contracts, where one contract is
signed before the repeated encounter starts, and short term contracts, i.e., in each encounter
a new contract is agreed upon by the agents.
6.1 Short Term Contracts
Repetition of the encounters between the contracting and the contracted agents enables the
agents to reach ecient short term contracts if the number of encounters is large enough and
if the contracted agent can be \punished" suciently severely
[
Radner, 1981; Radner, 1985;
Malcomson and Spinnewyn, 1988
]
.
Based on the average outcome, the contracting agent could form an accurate estimate of
the contracted agent's eort over time. That is, if the contracting agent wants the contracted
agent to make a certain eort level of ê 2 Eort in all the encounters, it can compute the
expected outcome over time if the contracted agent actually performs the task with that eort
level. The contracting agent can keep track of the cumulative sum of the actual outcomes
and compare it with the expected outcome. If after several encounters the contracting agent
realizes that the cumulative outcome is below a given function of the expected outcome, it
should impose a big \punishment" on the contracted agent. If the function over the expected




, the probability of imposing a \punishment" when
the contracted agent is in fact carrying out the desired eort level can be made very low.
Meanwhile the probability of eventually imposing the \punishment" if the agent does not
do ê is 1.0.
In particular, suppose there is asymmetric information where we assume that in each of
the encounters the situation is similar to that of Section 5.1, meaning that in each encounter
t, the outcome q
t
is a function of the contracted agent's eort level e
t
in that encounter
and the state of the world 
t
(which may change from one encounter to the other). In each




), and the contracted agent




). If there is a single encounter
then only second best contracts can be achieved and we denote the reward function and the




). We denote the rst-best solution by (r̂; ê) and the expected
outcome in this case for the contracting and the contracted agent by v̂ and x̂ respectively.




, although it is a weaker
condition than that of Nash equilibrium. For any positive number epsilon, an epsilon equi-
librium is a pair of strategies that allows the average of each agent's expected utility to be
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within epsilon from the expected utility of the best response to the other agent's strategy.
The rst-best strategies can be sustained in perfect epsilon equilibria of the multiple
encounters situation by \trigger strategies." The trigger strategy for the contracted agent
denoted by  is very simple: it uses the eort level function ê until the rst encounter
where the contracting agent does not use the reward function r̂; at that encounter and in
each encounter thereafter the contracted agent will optimize against the reward function
announced for each encounter.
The suitable trigger strategy for the contracting agent is more complicated. In each
encounter t, based on the history of outcomes through encounters (t   1), the contracting
agent must decide whether to make the reward r̂ or switch to the reward function r

. If
its switching rule is too lax, then the contracted agent may be able to accumulate a large
enough extra expected utility by cheating before getting caught thereby making cheating
attractive. On the other hand, if the switching rule is too strict, then there will be a
substantial probability that the contracting agent will switch to r

before the contracted











is the outcome in encounter t if the contracted agent
uses the eort level function e
t
and the state of the world is 
t
. We dene S
n
to be the


















are independent and identically distributed since the 
t
's are. Their expected value is ĉ.
We let b
n
be a strictly increasing sequence of positive numbers (n  1), and dene the
random variables
~
N and N by:
~
N = minfn  1 : S
n
  nĉ   b
n
g; N = minf
~
N;Tg (28)
The following trigger strategy should be used by the contracting agent: pay the contracted
agent r̂ in each period through N and thereafter use the reward function r

. We shall denote
this strategy by ((b
n
)).




on these strategies is as follows: For any  > 0 there
exists a sequence (b
n
) in B and T

such that for all T  T

the pair of strategies (((b
n
)); ) is
an  equilibrium, and yields the contracting and contracted agent average expected utilities







the situation of symmetric information with uncertainty is considered. That is, the
situation of a single encounter is as in Section 4.2. It provides Pareto-optimal strategies only in the case
that there are innitely many encounters.
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6.2 Long Term Contracts
In the previous section we assumed that the number of encounters between the contracting
and contracted agents may be very large. This enables the contracting agent's strategy for
oering a contract in a given time period t, to depend on the average outcome in the t  1
prior encounters. If there is a limited number of encounters the contracts need to be more
complicated since there is not enough information that is accumulated.
For example, suppose that the agent is evaluated according to its average performance
and there is an uncertainty about the state of the world (i.e., each single encounter is as in
Section 4.2). If the contracted agent is \lucky" in the rst encounter, the outcome will be
high, and in the second encounter it can take a low eort level without adversely aecting
the sum of both encounters. The contracted agent therefore has a motivation to adjust its
eort over time as a function of its previous performance. As a result of this phenomenon,




in general. This type of behavior also arises when the number of encounters
is very large. However, such behavior will eventually be detected.





. It is assumed that the contracting agent can commit itself before
the rst encounter to a long term contract that will be implemented during all their encoun-
ters. The outcome of each encounter depends on the contracted agent's eort level (which is
unobservable to the contracting agent) and the state of the world in that encounter, which
is not known to either agent, as in Section 4.2.




and before the rst encounter the
contracting agent oers a binding contract. The reward in the rst encounter depends upon
the outcome of that encounter, but the reward of the second encounter depends upon the
outcomes of the rst and second encounters. If the contract is accepted by the contracted
agent it should then choose the eort level of the rst encounter. The outcome is observed
by both agents and the contracted agent is paid according to the contract.
In the second encounter, the contracted agent chooses an eort level which is a function
of the outcome of the rst encounter. The outcome of the second encounter is also observed
by both agents and the rewards are given.
When the contracting agent chooses the contract, it should solve a maximization prob-
lem similar to that of Section 4.2. However, in its expected utility of the maximization
expression (1) should be replaced by its expected utility in both encounters. Similarly, it
should consider the appropriate constraints (i.e., IR and IC) on the eort levels chosen by
the contracted agent in both encounters.
34
Subject to these constraints, the contracting agent is able to update the contracted agent's





rewards in the second encounter should be an increasing function of the outcome of the rst
encounter.
7 Subcontracting to a Group
Suppose that the task the contracting agent wants to contract can be performed by a group
of agents. Each of the contracted agents is independent in the sense that it tries to maximize
its own utility. The contracting agent oers a contract to each of the possible contracted
agents. If one of them rejects the oer, than the contracting agent cannot subcontract the
task
14
. Otherwise, the contracted agents can simultaneously choose eort levels.
As in previous sections, the contracting agent cannot observe the eort levels and does
not supervise the group while the members carry out the task.
7.1 Individual Outcome is Observed
In this section we assume that each contracted agent yields an observable outcome of q
i
and that the overall outcome will be equal to the sum of the q
i
s. The advantage of using
the multiple outputs to form the basis for a reward to each agent is that usually some





Nalebu and Stiglitz, 1983b
]
, i.e., in such a situation, the individual actions can be
estimated by comparing the performances of the dierent agents.
7.1.1 One Agent's eort does not inuence other agents' outcomes
The contracted agents have symmetric information
Suppose the outcome for an agent is a probabilistic function of its eort level e
i
, that









example, in the German-US robots case,  could reect the level of the mineral in the whole
site, while 
i
represents the level of minerals in the exact location of contracted agent i. Each
of the contracted agents observes  before it chooses its eort level, but it does not observe

i
before making its choice.
We assume that the contracted agents are identical, i.e., have the same utility function
U
ced










We will also consider the situation where if an agent accepts the contract, it will be implemented





are the distribution functions of 
i
.
In the rst model, there is no exchange of messages between the agents. Since only the
outcome is observed, this is the only thing the rewards can depend upon. The main question
to be asked is: is it better to make a contract based on all the outcomes, or is it better that
a contracted agent's reward depend only on its own outcome?
When the contracted agents' outcomes are independent, then observing all the q
i
s pro-
vides no additional information about the contracted agent's eort. In this case, the rewards
should depends only on the individual outcome.









about the state of the world. The rewards of a specic agent should then depend upon its






Nalebu and Stiglitz, 1983b
]
.





g provides sucient statistical information for . When the number of
contracted agents becomes very large, the estimation of  converges to the true value. In
such situations, the rewards should depend on q
i
and on the estimation of .
Another option for designing a contract for a group of contracted agents is to pay the
contracted agents according to their ordinal positions alone and not according to the actual
size of their output, i.e., to encourage a contest among the agents.
Suppose there are two contracted agents. Using the contest approach, there is a winner's
reward r
w
and a loser's reward r
l
. The winner's output q
w
is not necessarily worth r
w
, so
that the winner is actually paid more than its contribution to the overall outcome. This is
done in order to motivate the contracted agents to choose greater eort levels. A larger prize
for the winner, motivates greater eort by all agents and increases the contracting agent's
outcome
[
Nalebu and Stiglitz, 1983b
]
.
If the rst contracted agent chooses eort level e
1
, and the second chooses eort level e
2
,








. Each of the contracted agents tries to
choose higher levels of eort in order to be paid r
w
. However, even though they both choose
























. An interesting result from this is that in some situations it is possible to
make the contracted agents choose an eort level, using the above \contest" mechanism,
36
which is even larger than when the contracting agent can observe the agent's eort levels,
i.e., better than the rst best contract.
A variation of this method is when the \winner" must win by an amount greater than
a certain margin. That is, instead of ranking contracted agents solely on the basis of the
relative position of their outcomes, the contracting agent can rank one contracted agent
above another if that agent's outcome is greater than its opponent's by a positive margin.
The introduction of \margins" can lower the probability that any \prize" will be paid while
maintaining the same level of motivation for choosing high levels of eort.
There are several other methods for possible reward for a group: giving a reward only to





. Rewards that are based on relative performance are generally more
exible, and reduce the risk taken by the contracted agents
[
Nalebu and Stiglitz, 1983a
]
.
Contracted agents have private information
In this case we assume that each contracted agent's outcome is aected by dierent
aspects of the state of the world in which each agent can only observe its own private \aspect"
of that world. There is a probabilistic correlation between these aspects, but agents cannot
observe each other's aspects and the contracting agent cannot observe any of them. For
example, if a US robot subcontracts its digging to a German robot and a French robot, then
each of them can observe the level of the mineral in its own digging site before signing the
contract and since they dig in adjacent sites, their mineral levels are correlated. The US
robot, however, does not know either levels.






); l = A;B
[
Ma et al., 1988
]








(i.e., the world can be in









for i = 1; 2. We denote this probability by p
l
i











As in previous sections, the level of eort, e
l
is not observable. We do assume however,

























































Agent l (= A;B) privately observes 
l
before signing a contract with the contracting agent.
The contracting agent is risk neutral and the contracted agents are risk averse. Their utilities
37
functions are similar to that which appears in Section 7.1.1. Given the utility function of
the contracted agent l, and the state of the world, one can compute the \disutility" of
producing an outcome such as q
l
. Therefore, the contracted agent's utility can be expressed
as a function of the rewards and the outcome (as we did, for example, in Section 5.3). We














A typical contract that can be oered by the contracting agent to agent A in this case,
is of the following form
[
Ma et al., 1988
]
:






. Your reward, r
A
will depend not





 if agent B produces q
B
1
, you will be paid r
A
i1
 if agent B produces q
B
2
, you will be paid r
A
i2





Demski and Sappington, 1984
]
the maximization problem of the contracting agent was
stated. It restricted the contracted agent's output choices to be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
given that they are guaranteed at least their reservation price (conditional on their private

























































































































) i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j
(32)
The result of this maximization provides the contracting agent with rewards that dis-
courage a contracted agent from choosing output q
l
1


















. These contracts yield to the contracting agent the
















and receiving a sure reward of r
l
2
then the contracting agent will get the maximum outcome if both agents respond as the







. In the case of a single agent, the constraints ensure that the contracted
agent will choose the desired eort level. However, if there are two agents, there exists
another pair of equilibrium strategies whose outcome, from the contracted agents' point of
view, is better to both agents than the outcome in the equilibrium the contracting agent
wants to implement. The outcome for the contracting agent if they choose that level of eort
however, is low
[
Demski and Sappington, 1984
]
. In particular, there is an equilibrium for
both contracted agents to always choose the outcome q
l
1
(regardless of their observed state),
and in all states they will both be strictly better o than in the equilibrium preferred by the
contracting agent (i.e., choose q
l
1






if the state is 
2
.). Of course the
contracting agent will denitely be worse o.
It was suggested in
[
Demski and Sappington, 1984
]
to strengthen the incentive constraints
of one contracted agent so that its chosen strategy will provide a better outcome for the
contracting agent. But although this method does guarantee a unique equilibrium, it is also
costly to the contracting agent.
Another costless method of making the contracted agents choose the \correct" strategies
was suggested in
[
Ma et al., 1988
]
. This method, however, makes the contracts more compli-
cated. The main idea is that the contracting agent oers one of the contracted agents, e.g.,
A, a range of extra possible output options q
A
1




additional  is costless to agent A, but it can be used as a signal to the contracting agent,
e.g.,
\From my perspective, the probability that B is choosing q
B
1




A detailed mechanism based on this idea is described in
[
Ma et al., 1988
]
and proves
that it provides a unique equilibrium that guarantees the contracting agent its second best
outcome.
7.1.2 Contracted agent's eort inuences others
In this section we consider situations where the output of a contracted agent depends both
on its level of eort and the other contracted agents' level of eort, and where there is
symmetrical uncertainty about the state of the world.
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g of possible outputs and a nite set Eort
i
of possible eort levels. We











g. The output of a contracted agent depends on some unknown (by all agents)
features of the world 
i
, in addition to its level of eort and the other contracted agents'

















). This probabilistic distribution
induces another probabilistic distribution over sequences of outcomes, for any given sequence
of actions as in Section 4.2. This means that we extend } of Section 4.2 to ts the multi-
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ort
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; q) = 1.
If the contracting agent can observe the actions chosen by the contracted agents then, as
in Section 4.1, it can oer the contracted agents a forcing contract.
If the contracting agent cannot observe the eort levels then the contract it should oer



























). Similar to the maximization problem in the case of one contracted
agent, the contracting agent should maximize its expected utility given similar constraints
to (IC:3) and (IR:2). A similar three steps procedure, as in the one contracted agent case









, that minimize the expected rewards of the
contracting agents subject to the reservation utility constraint (IR:5) and participation con-









their other options. In some situations, depending on the probability function } (e.g., if
there is perfect correlation between the 
i
s), and the possible \punishments" the contract-
ing agent can impose on the \shrinking" contracted agents, the contracting agent may gain
similar expected utility as in the case where it can observe the agents' eort levels (i.e., as





In some situations, however, the contracts found by the above maximization problem
may fail to uniquely implement the contracting agent's preferred actions, as in the previous
section. There may be other actions according to the contract that are better to the con-
tracted agents, as in the previous section, where the agent's eort does not inuence the
others.
The main question is how the contracting agent can make the contracted agents choose
the set of actions it prefers. One approach is to try and strengthen the constraints that are
related to contracted agents, but this of course, is costly for the contracting agent. Another
possibility, as in the previous section, is to construct a sophisticated contract. We may
40
distinguish between two situations:
1. actions are mutually observed by the contracted agents (but not by the contracting
agent).
2. actions are only privately observed
In the rst case, the contracted agents pick an eort level simultaneously, and afterwards
they (but not the contracting agent) can observe each other's actions. There is some delay
after the observation and the realization of the outcome, which is then used for message
exchange.
The contracting agent can try to extract information about the eort levels from the
agents and although the contracted agent can provide false information, the accuracy of this
information is known to the other contracted agent. The contracting agent may then appeal
to the other agents for verication.





by A and B. Suppose by using the techniques of previous sections, and assuming the
contracting agent can observe the agent's actions, the contracting agent would like the two






respectively, in order to maximize its own
expected utility, taking into consideration their reservation prices. r

a
can be the payments









) = û and similarly r

b
can be the reward for the second contracted agent. Note,
that since U
ced
(e; r) = v(r)  c(e), v(r

a









































































































































The contracting agent should oer the following mechanism:
Stage 1: Both contracted agents take actions simultaneously.



















































































































Stage 3: Agent B can either \agree" or \challenge." If B \challenges" A's announcement

























are described in Tables 1 and 2. We
denote by r
a
the reward that satises v(r
a










for B we denote by r
b
















that the following strategies form a unique perfect equilibrium
of the described mechanism: Agent A chooses e

a
at Stage 1, and at Stage 2 reports honestly,
whatever action pair was chosen at Stage 1. Agent B chooses e

b
at stage 1 and \agrees" at
Stage 3, if and only if, A is honest at Stage 2.
The intuition behind this proof is as follows. The contracting agent elicits information
from agent A and uses B's reaction as a policing device. If B accuses A in lying, its outcome
depends on . However, due to assumption 34, the expected outcome from  to B is valuable,
if and only if, A has lied. In addition, given that the contracted agents report honestly, the
rewards will motivate them to choose the required actions. These results can easily be





In the case that actions are only privately observed, it is not possible to implement
the results of perfect supervision (i.e., the rst best contract, where the result is that the
contracting agent observes the contracted agents' actions).
However, even the implementation of the second best is not so simple. The rewards
that were suggested in the beginning of the section are appropriate only if the agents follow
the actions prescribed by the contracting agent. It is possible however, that the contracted
42





a multi-stage mechanism is presented that makes the contracted
agents choose the appropriate actions of the second best contract.
7.2 Individual Outcome is Not Observed
There are other situations in which the contracting agent cannot observe the individual
outcome (or such an outcome does not exist), but rather can only observe the overall outcome
of all the agents' eort
[
Holmstrom, 1982; Rasmusen, 1987
]
. Even in the case of certainty,
i.e., the state of the world is known, there is a problem in making the contracted agents take
the preferred level of action, since there is no way for the contracting agent to nd out the
eort level of each of the individual agent, given the overall output. For example, suppose
two robots agreed to dig minerals, but they both put the minerals in the same truck, it is
not possible then to gure out who dug what. If the contracting agent wants the contracted
agents to take the vector of eort level e

it can search for a contract such that, if the















. That is, if
all agents choose the appropriate eort level, each of them gets b
i
and if any of them does
not, all get nothing.
In some cases the contracted agents take sequential actions. That is, agent 1 chooses
its eort level and performs its part of the task which is observed by the other contracted
agents, but not the contracting agent. The second contracted agent then, chooses its eort
level, based on the rst agent's actions, and its eort level is observed by the other contracted
agents, and so on. After the last agent nishes its part, the outcome of the whole sequence
is gured out and observed by all agents (including the contracting agent). If in addition,
there is also some uncertainty in the environment, the outcome function may be similar to








) + . If, no matter how low
the eort levels exerted by contracted agents 1; :::; i are, it is possible for the rest of the





is a monotonic function from the eort level of the rest of the contracted agents, then the
contracting agent can construct a contract in which it can obtain its rst best outcome
[
Banerjee and Beggs, 1989
]
. The contract enables agent i, whose choice of eort level is a
function of the eort levels of agents 1; :::i  1, to use its monitoring capability eectively.
Another interesting situation is when a group of contracted agents can commit themselves
to cooperate. Although, they can still be individually motivated, if they can agree upon a
cooperation level, the outcome (under appropriate conditions) can be better to all of them.
An even more ecient result may be obtained if the contracted agents work as a team and
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share the outcome. Such a situation may occur, for example, if all the contracted agents
are German robots, that have the same general task to maximize Germany's prots
[
Macho-




In this paper we presented techniques that can be used in dierent cases where contracting
of a task by an agent to another agent or a set of agents in non-collaborative environments
is benecial.
We considered several such situations and described the maximization problems that
should be solved by the contracting agent in order to design a benecial contract to itself.
In most of the situations we also presented procedures that can be used for solving these
maximization problems by the contracting agent.









that can be used for
automating those procedures. The designer of the automated agent should build an interface
between the chosen package and its agent's software.
The contracted agents computational task is easier. In most of the situations, given a
contract, the contracted agent needs only to check the validity of the inequalities that appear
as constraints in the contracting agent's maximization problem. The contracted agent needs
to check the validity of the individual-rationality constraint (IR) to decide whether to accept
the contract and since all variables are known, based on the suggested contract, this check
is very easy.
When the contracted agent needs to decide which eort level to provide, it should consider
its expected utility from its eort level, similar to maximization problem described in the
participation constraints (IC).
We present below a summary of the results for the dierent situations considered in this
paper.
When two agents have full information about each other, contracts can be signed without
a delay. The results of contracting in full information situations are as follows:
1. If the contracting agent can observe and supervise the contracted agent's actions (Sec-
tion 4), then it can force the contracted agent to provide the eort level preferred
by the contracting agent, and thus the contracting agent maximizes its utility. The
contracted agent obtains its reservation price.
2. If the contracting agent does not supervise the contracted agent's actions, but there is
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full information and no uncertainty concerning the outcome of the contracted agent's
actions (Section 4.1), then the expected utility to both agents is as in the previous
case. That is, in this situation, there is no need for the contracting agent's supervision.
3. If there is uncertainty in the environment but the contracted agent is risk neutral
(Section 4.2.1) then the contracting agent's utility will be as in the previous two cases
(i.e., the agents reach a rst best contract). The expected utility of the contracted agent
will be equal to its reservation price; however, its actual outcome may be less than its
reservation price.
4. If there is uncertainty as in the previous case, but the contracted agent is risk averse
(Section 4.2.2) then the contracting agent's expected utility will be lower than in the
previous case (i.e., the agents reach a second best contract). The contracted agent's
expected utility is higher than its reservation price.
5. Monitoring (Section 4.2.3) cannot improve the contracting agent's utility in case 3
above, but may increase its utility in the previous case (4) when the contracted agent
is neutral toward risk.
If there is asymmetric information the contracts should include a menu of options and
there is a need for the exchange of messages. However, in all the situations the agents
can consider only contracts in which it is in the interest of the contracted agent to honestly
report its private information. Below is a summary of the results of main cases in asymmetric
information situations:
1. If the contracted agent knows the state of the world but the contracting agent does
not (Section 5.1), then the contracting agent's expected utility is lower than if they
have symmetric beliefs and the contracted agent's expected utility is higher.
2. If the contracted agent is able to collect more information before it performs the agreed-
upon task but only after signing the contract, and the contracted agent cannot opt out
after signing an agreement (Section 5.2), then the contracting agent can get is second
best utility if the contracted agent is risk neutral.
3. If the contracting agent also has private information (Section 5.5), but its private
information does not directly inuence the contracted agent's utilities, then in most of
the situations, there exists a mechanism in which all types of the contracting agents
do strictly better than the fully informed contracted agent (i.e., even better than in
the rst best contract).
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4. If there are several agents in the environment (Section 5.7) in most situations the
contracting agent can design a second best contract.
When there are more than one encounter between the agents (Section 6) they can reach
either short term contracts or enforceable long term contracts. The contracts in the rst
case are similar to those of one encounter; however, the strategies used by the agents are
more complicated.
1. If the agents agreed upon short term contracts, and the number of encounters are large
enough, even in asymmetric information situations, they can reach rst-best contracts.
2. If the number of encounters is small, enforceable long term encounters are more bene-
cial to the contracting agent. However, it is still dicult to design an ecient contract.
The last set of situations that were considered in the paper is of contracting to a group.
The type of contracts that are used depends on the following factors: whether the individ-
ual outcome of each contracted agent is observed by the contracting agent, does the eort
level of one contracted agent inuences the other agents' outcome, and whether each of the
contracted agents has private information. In some of these situations an ecient contract
for the contracting agent may be quite complicated and may require two rounds of message
exchanges.
The most important problem that a designer of an agent faces in a CMA environment,
is which utility function to provide its agent with. Of course, the personality of the designer
(his/her attitude toward risk) will aect this decision, but computational considerations
should also be taken into consideration. It is clear that when the agents are risk neutral, all
the maximization problems presented in this paper are much easier to solve. Furthermore,
more ecient results are obtained in such situations.
However, if the designer would like its agent to be risk averse, then the utility function
should be chosen carefully. In order to support most of the results presented in this paper,
the contracted agent's utility function should be additively separable in rewards and eort
of the form U
ced






> 0 and c
00
 0.
If there is more than one possible contracted agent in the environment, the measure of
risk aversion should be considered by the designer. A less risk-averse agent will usually have





We are now in the process of applying the techniques presented in this paper to the
performance of trucks in the Truckworld
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